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HIGHER EDUCATION LAW—THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS
OF STUDENT LOANS: A PLEA FOR IMPACTED STUDENTS
Kelly A. Bednarz*
Throughout the United States, college enrollment has overwhelmingly
increased, reaching its peak in 2010 with approximately twenty
million students. Due to the expanded accessibility to attend college
through the Department of Education’s higher education programs,
the ability to attend college is no longer solely for the elite. This
rapid growth, however, has created additional challenges. Despite
the evolving higher education demand, government regulations and
oversight have mostly remained stagnant. Colleges began to
capitalize and take advantage of this market, prompting the rise of
for-profit colleges. In 2012, about 12 percent of students attended
for-profit colleges, as opposed to the 0.2 percent of students about
twenty years prior.
Although not all for-profit colleges misuse the system, many colleges
have been criticized in recent years for predatory and illegal
recruiting tactics. The Department of Education is aware of these
problems, but continually enables this conduct through lack of
oversight and mismanaged federal funds. The students enrolled in
these for-profit colleges have little to no recourse within the court
system or otherwise after acquiring burdensome debt based on
deceptive tactics and unrealistic promises.
This Note will argue that students who are negatively impacted by the
predatory tactics of for-profit colleges should have a remedy under
the theory of estoppel against the government. Although there is a
heightened “affirmative misconduct” standard for this claim, the
system will likely go unchanged without a direct effect on the
government, given its own interest and benefits based on the current
structure of the system.

INTRODUCTION
The United States higher education system is facing a financial
crisis.1 As of 2018, forty-four million people owe approximately $1.5
* Candidate for J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2018. A special
thank you to Professor René Reich-Graefe, Alison Wynn, Esq., and the Western New England
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trillion in student loan debt,2 and the federal government, as the primary
lender of student loans, maintains approximately ninety percent of that
debt.3 By means of the Department of Education (DOE), the federal
government has “relinquished direct control of the student loan program,
opening its bank to corporations concerned with profits, not diplomas.”4
This incentive for profits is a reality, as the DOE has calculated that the
federal government can earn up to twenty percent profit on each loan.5
Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren continues to voice her
concern about this for-profit phenomenon, stressing that the DOE
continues to fail students by allowing for-profit colleges to drain federal
funds despite years of criticism over their suspicious practices.6 There is
also a concern that this financial crisis will “exacerbate income
inequality for decades to come.”7
The current financial aid system is unsustainable and widely
recognized as failing students.8 Economists suggest that the financial aid
system is ineffective because “colleges and universities will react to the
incentives [government] policies create and not passively accept their
consequences.”9 These policies allow higher education institutions to
“increase[] their prices and general spending because they [can] get

Law Review staff for the invaluable feedback throughout this Note-writing process. To my
parents, Edward and Lori Bednarz, my sister, Katie, and future husband, Timmy Clark, thank
you for your endless love and support.
1. See Donna Rosato, Is Student Debt the Next Financial Crisis?, CONSUMER REPORTS
(June 30, 2016), http://www.consumerreports.org/student-loan-debt-crisis/is-student-debt-thenext-financial-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/PQN8-TCJ4].
2. A Look at the Shocking Student Loan Debt Statistics for 2018, STUDENT LOAN HERO
(Jan. 24, 2018), https://studentloanhero.com/student-loan-debt-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/
7G58-Y9MG].
3. James B. Steele & Lance Williams, Who Got Rich Off the Student Debt Crisis, CTR.
FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (June 28, 2016), https://www.revealnews.org/article/whogot-rich-off-the-student-debt-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/WLS3-DJ9K].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Tracy Jan, Warren Calls for More Oversight of For-Profit Colleges, BOS. GLOBE
(June 10, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2015/06/10/elizabeth-warrenchastising-department-education-over-for-profit-college-rules/
Pfn1X3iW9RXDZ9DVBbLj5O/story.html.
7. Steele & Williams, supra note 3.
8. Andrew Gillen, Financial Aid in Theory and Practice, in DOING MORE WITH LESS:
MAKING COLLEGES WORK BETTER 15, 15 (Joshua C. Hall ed., 2010).
9. Id. (quoting MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON & MORTON OWEN SCHAPIRO, THE STUDENT
AID GAME: MEETING NEED AND REWARDING TALENT IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION
139 (1998).
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away with it”10 In 1987, William Bennett, then-Secretary of Education,
acknowledged that increases in financial aid “enabled colleges and
universities blithely to raise their tuitions, confident that Federal loan
subsidies would help cushion the increase.”11 This theory is known as
the “Bennett Hypothesis,”12 and has proven true since the cost of tuition
at higher education institutions has increased at a rate “four-and-a-half
times faster than inflation” over three decades.13 Nearly thirty years
later, Arne Duncan, Secretary of Education during the Obama
administration, admits the same issues exist today.14 Duncan blames the
challenges of reform for this perpetuation of the financial aid crisis,
which he says cannot “become a discussion-ending excuse for inaction
or for defending the status quo.”15 Despite widespread criticism from
the government, admitting change is imperative, there continues to be no
major progress toward a solution for this acknowledged system failure.16
As evidence of this failing financial aid system, a number of forprofit colleges have recently been shut down, leaving thousands of
students with massive amounts of debt and no college degree.17 One of
the most well-known for-profit colleges, ITT Technical Institute (ITT
Tech), abruptly closed over one hundred of its campuses when their
federal financial aid eligibility was revoked.18 “Roughly 80 percent of
ITT’s revenues [came] from government-backed student loans.”19
10. Id. at 23 (quoting RUPERT WILKINSON, AIDING STUDENTS, BUYING STUDENTS 147
(2005)).
11. Id. at 29 (quoting William J. Bennett, Our Greedy Colleges, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18,
1987)).
12. Id.
13. VICKIE CHOITZ & PATRICK REIMHERR, CTR. FOR POSTSECONDARY & ECON.
SUCCESS, MIND THE GAP: HIGH UNMET FINANCIAL NEED THREATENS PERSISTENCE AND
COMPLETION FOR LOW-INCOME COMMUNITY COLLEGE STUDENTS 1 (Apr. 2013),
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED544243.pdf [https://perma.cc/5V85-7NJB].
14. Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec’y of Educ., Making the Financial Aid System Sustainable,
Remarks at the 2013 FSA Training Conference for Financial Aid Professionals (Dec. 4, 2013),
http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/making-financial-aid-system-sustainable
[https://perma.cc/TJ62-JSGF].
15. Id.
16. Kevin Carey, Fixing Financial Aid, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 4, 2013),
http://www.chronicle.com/article/Fixing-Financial-Aid/137593
[https://perma.cc/CK9GJQ8S].
17. Kathryn Vasel & Katie Lobosco, For-Profit College ITT Shuts Down: Tens of
Thousands of Students in the Lurch, CNN MONEY (Sept. 9, 2016, 11:21 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/09/06/pf/college/itt-shuts-down/ [https://perma.cc/E8KW-M8EQ].
18. Id.
19. Richard Morgan, For-Profit College Shuts Down, Shafting 40,000 Students, N.Y.
POST (Sept. 6, 2016, 12:05 PM), http://nypost.com/2016/09/06/for-profit-college-itt-is-
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Consequently, the 35,000 students enrolled at ITT Tech during the
shutdown will be unable to finish their degrees because, as the school
advertises, “[i]t is unlikely that any credits earned at an ITT Technical
Institute will be transferable to or accepted by any institution other than
an ITT Technical Institute.”20 This institution has been the subject of
investigation by the federal government for years, but no adequate
transition program is in place for these aggrieved students.21 The DOE
indicated that students enrolled at the time of closing may have their
federal loans canceled, but this approach does not apply to all students
that are in need of a remedy.22
Since the recent closings of failed for-profit colleges,23 there have
been approximately 26,000 claims received by the DOE for loan
forgiveness, but only about fourteen percent have been approved.24 The
DOE’s loan forgiveness program is supposed to provide relief for
“[a]nyone who can prove a school used illegal or deceptive tactics in
violation of state law to persuade them to borrow money for college.”25
However, this process is “difficult to navigate,” and cases are rarely
successful.26
Students significantly impacted by the negative effects of the
financial aid system have little recourse within the court system,27 and

closing-after-federal-loan-crackdown/ [https://perma.cc/QV7A-QZGC].
20. 2016-2017 Catalog, ITT TECH. INST. 48 (2016) (emphasis omitted), http://itttech.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/061.pdf [https://perma.cc/XEL3-Q7MK]; see also Erin
Gallagher, ITT Tech Students Await Answers on Their Futures, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Sept. 30,
2016, 7:25 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/daily-southtown/news/ct-sta-ittstudents-register-st-0930-20160930-story.html [https://perma.cc/3GG5-SWS6?type=image]
(explaining that ITT Tech credits are unlikely to transfer because the curriculum does not meet
the standard of accredited colleges).
21. Vasel & Lobosco, supra note 17.
22. Id.
23. In 2016, ITT Technical Institute and Corinthian College closed after the DOE
revoked financial aid due to deceptive tactics. Id.
24. Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, ITT Tech Students Refuse to Repay Loans in Protest
Over Government Policy, WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/grade-point/wp/2016/09/14/itt-tech-students-refuse-to-repay-loans-in-protest-overgovernment-policy/?utm_term=.60546a662c87 [hereinafter Douglas-Gabriel, ITT Tech
Students].
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. The Higher Education Act prohibits injunctive relief for a plaintiff, which includes
a plaintiff’s claim to prevent the government from collecting on a student loan. Kemper v.
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 17-683 (TNM), 2018 WL 300370, at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2018).
There is also no explicit cause of action for a plaintiff under the Higher Education Act and
case precedent does not allow for an implied cause of action. Id.
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find themselves buried in debt that cannot be discharged in bankruptcy.28
Since there is currently no developed legal remedy for the injustice that
these students experience, students should have an equitable remedy
against the DOE under the theory of estoppel. Although there are
obstacles to prove the claim, there will be no change in the system until
it begins to directly impact the federal government, which is only
possible if it is the one being sued.
This Note argues that students negatively impacted by the DOE’s
policies that enable predatory, for-profit practices should be able to estop
the government from collecting on burdensome student loan debt. Part I
of this Note will explain the DOE’s authority and its disbursement of
federal funds, as well as the original purpose of the Higher Education
Act. Part II of this Note will discuss the relationship between the DOE
and for-profit colleges, specifically regarding accrediting agencies. Part
III of this Note will address the predatory practices of colleges,
particularly in the for-profit sector, and the DOE’s awareness of this
harmful conduct with no action. Part IV of this Note will identify the
legal elements required to bring a claim of estoppel against the
government. Finally, Part V of this Note argues that negatively
impacted students should meet the difficult standard of establishing an
estoppel claim against the government due to the government’s
contribution towards the problem, while also recognizing public policy
concerns.
I.

HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEM

A. The Department of Education
The DOE is a federal agency that oversees and improves the United
States educational system.29 Congress established the DOE30 to
accomplish four main purposes: (1) establish policies for administering,
distributing, and monitoring federal financial aid for higher education;
(2) collect and analyze data for reporting to Congress, educators, and the
general public; (3) bring major issues and problems to national attention;
and (4) enforce federal statutes regarding discrimination to ensure equal

28. Steele & Williams, supra note 3 (“Student loans are virtually the only consumer
debt that cannot be discharged in bankruptcy except in the rarest of cases.”).
29. The Federal Role in Education, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/
overview/fed/role.html [https://perma.cc/39T3-QKFU] [hereinafter The Federal Role in
Education].
30. 20 U.S.C. § 3411 (1979).
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access to education.31
1. Higher Education Act of 1965
The DOE regulates the United States higher education system,
which provides financial assistance32 to approximately thirteen million
students—awarding approximately $120 billion per year in various types
of federal financial aid.33 This authority is granted by the Higher
Education Act of 1965, which was enacted, in part, to remove financial
barriers for eligible college students.34 Title IV of the Higher Education
Act, which provides financial assistance to students,35 “represented the
first generally available aid program for postsecondary students.”36
Federally funded student loans were originally designed to allow any
student from any background to attend college; however, the DOE’s
management of the financial aid system is no longer serving that
intended purpose.37
2. Types of Higher Education Institutions
There are different types of higher education institutions, which
include public colleges, nonprofit colleges, and for-profit colleges.38
Public colleges are primarily funded by state governments and are
typically in the form of state and community colleges.39 Nonprofit
colleges are by their nature not-for-profit, meaning that they are not in

31. An Overview of the U.S. Department of Education, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/focus/what_pg2.html#howdoes [https://perma.cc/RF3ZVLYZ].
32. The Federal Role in Education, supra note 29.
33. Types of Aid, FED. STUDENT AID, DEP’T OF EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/
types#federal-aid [https://perma.cc/ZVH3-HZQR] [hereinafter Types of Aid].
34. ANGELICA CERVANTES ET AL., OPENING THE DOORS TO HIGHER EDUCATION:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT 40 YEARS LATER, TG RESEARCH &
ANALYTICAL
SERVS.
1
(2005),
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED542500.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7DG6-5LAJ].
35. 20 U.S.C. § 1070. (2009).
36. CERVANTES ET AL., supra note 34, at 20.
37. See LINDSEY BURKE & STUART BUTLER, HERITAGE FOUND., ACCREDITATION:
REMOVING THE BARRIER TO HIGHER EDUCATION REFORM (Sept. 21, 2012),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/09/accreditation-removing-the-barrier-tohigher-education-reform [https://perma.cc/2PDX-28F4].
38. College Terminology Decoded: For-Profit, Nonprofit, Private and Public
Universities, MY COLL. GUIDE, http://mycollegeguide.org/blog/2013/12/college-terminologydecoded-forprofit-nonprofit-private-public-universities/ [https://perma.cc/3RCE-VLXB].
39. M. Douglas, Public and Private: What’s the Difference?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar.
6, 2006), https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2006/03/06/lombardi [https://perma.cc/
KPY5-AWFP].
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the business of making money, and are accountable “to a financially
disinterested board.”40
Contrastingly, for-profit colleges are in the business to make money
and must answer to their owners or shareholders.41 The primary
motivation for the owners is to profit off of the college’s operations,
similar to running a business.42 The main difference between for-profit
and nonprofit colleges is the “non-distribution constraint,” which
provides a limitation on a nonprofit college’s ability to spend profits.43
For-profit colleges are not restricted with regard to spending the revenue
and may distribute them to the shareholders.44 This structure results in
for-profit colleges “sacrific[ing] long-term success for short-term gains,”
creating a flawed academic system.45
3. Federal Financial Aid System Disbursement of Funds
There are a series of procedures required by the government before
any loans or grants are awarded to assist with the cost of college.46 First,
a student must submit a Free Application for Student Financial Aid
(FASFA) to determine their economic need.47 This provides the
government with an understanding of the student’s and parents’
economic assets and income.48 The government then calculates the data
to determine the amount a student could pay toward their college
education, referred to as the Expected Family Contribution (EFC).49
Next, each college or university individually calculates its cost of

40. Robert Shireman, The Important Difference Between For-Profit and Nonprofit
Colleges, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 16, 2014, 2:43 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shireman/the-important-difference-_b_5595903.html [https://perma.cc/D2HZ-8SHV].
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. (emphasis omitted); see also FOR-PROFIT UNIVERSITIES: THE SHIFTING
LANDSCAPE OF MARKETIZED HIGHER EDUCATION 16–17 (Tressie McMillan Cottom &
William A. Darity, Jr. eds., 2017) (discussing the non-distribution constraint limitation as
requiring a nonprofit college to reinvest profits into the institution and removing its ability to
distribute excess profits to administrators).
44. Shireman, supra note 40.
45. Id. (quoting financial aid expert Mark Kantrowitz). Although “[n]onprofit and
public colleges obviously can be quite aggressive in seeking money, sometimes creating
surpluses that look an awful lot like profit,” that issue is outside of the scope of this Note. Id.
46. How
Does
Financial
Aid
Work?,
PRINCETON
REV.,
https://www.princetonreview.com/college-advice/financial-aid-scholarship/financial-aid
[https://perma.cc/MEA8-NB2F].
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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attendance, which is the total estimated amount of tuition, fees, books,
travel, and other related expenses.50 The individual school then
determines how much financial aid a student will receive by subtracting
the student’s EFC, as determined by the FASFA, from the cost of
attendance.51 However, this system can be flawed because many
students cannot realistically afford the calculated EFC amount. 52
4. Types of Federal Financial Aid
Federal financial aid offers three types of assistance for students:
grants, loans, and work-study.53 Most commonly, the government
provides a variety of student loans that are available based upon a
student’s calculated financial need.54 The William D. Ford Federal
Direct Loan Program is the largest program offered to students.55 Under
this program, there are different options for borrowing, such as direct
subsidized loans, unsubsidized loans, PLUS loans, and consolidated
loans.56 Direct subsidized loans are for undergraduate students, and the
interest on these loans does not accumulate while students are enrolled at
least part time and up to six months after graduation or withdrawal.57 On
the other hand, direct unsubsidized loans accumulate interest while the
student is attending college, but do not require any payments on the loan
if the student is enrolled in school at least part time.58 PLUS loans are

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. The EFC calculates how much a student can contribute toward the cost of
enrollment in order to determine the amount of financial aid eligibility. B RIDGET TERRY
LONG, NAT’L CTR. FOR POSTSECONDARY RES., WHAT IS KNOWN ABOUT THE IMPACT OF
FINANCIAL
AID?:
IMPLICATIONS
FOR
POLICY,
6
(Apr.
2008),
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED501555.pdf [https://perma.cc/KS99-D89G]. Any amount
that the financial aid does not cover is considered unmet need. See id. In the 2003–04
academic year, after eligible grants and loans were applied to a student’s account, a dependent
student had $5911 in unmet need, and an independent student had $4503 in unmet need. Id. at
8. “Without sufficient financial aid, students increasingly turn to loans and credit cards. They
also work significant hours, and this has been shown to impact academic performance and
reduce the chances that a student will persist to college graduation.” Id. at 35.
53. The government provides grants to students, which are funds that the student does
not need to repay, as well as work-study programs, which subsidize student income for certain
qualified jobs. Types of Aid, supra note 33.
54. Id.
55. Types of Aid: Loans, FED. STUDENT AID, DEP’T OF EDUC.,
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/loans [https://perma.cc/7EWP-NW67].
56. Depending on the loan option that is received, students may not be required to have
a cosigner or credit check in order to be awarded the loan. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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for graduate level students, or parents of dependent students, to assist
with the cost of attendance.59 These “loans are provided to students
regardless of their creditworthiness and with no security.”60 Finally,
consolidated loans allow students to combine eligible loans for
repayment to one loan servicer.61
These federal loans cannot be discharged in bankruptcy
proceedings, so it is unavoidable debt for the student once incurred and a
guaranteed payment to the government.62 If a student does not repay
their federal loans—resulting in default—the federal government can
“penalize[] individual defaulters by garnishing their wages or restricting
access to future public subsidies.”63 The government also has the
authority to seize a student’s tax refund, impose additional collection
costs, bring a lawsuit against the student, and/or restrict future financial
aid or other federally funded benefits, such as social security.64
B. Accreditation of Higher Education Institutions
For an institution to receive financial aid, the DOE first requires it to
receive accreditation by a “nationally recognized” accreditor, which is a
Many
private educational association approved by the DOE.65
accrediting agencies exist, and they normally focus on a particular
educational area, such as healthcare or legal.66 An accrediting agency
becomes “nationally recognized” when the Secretary of Education
determines that the accreditor is a “reliable authorit[y] as to the quality

59. Id.
60. Susan Dynarski, An Economist’s Perspective on Student Loans in the United States
10 (Sept. 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (Brookings Institution ES Working Paper Series),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/
economist_perspective_student_loans_dynarski.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2F7-EYC9].
61. How to Repay Your Loans, FED. STUDENT AID, DEP’T OF EDUC.,
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans [https://perma.cc/8TMG-3YVK].
62. There are certain circumstances under which the federal loans may be discharged,
but they are rare, and mostly limited to discharge upon death or permanent disability. Steele
& Williams, supra note 3.
63. Nicholas W. Hillman, College on Credit: A Multilevel Analysis of Student Loan
Default, 37 REV. HIGHER EDUC. 169, 178 (2014).
64. Id. at 170.
65. Accreditation in the United States, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/
admins/finaid/accred/accreditation.html#Overview
[https://perma.cc/CZ36-AZR3]
[hereinafter Accreditation].
66. See Nationally Recognized Accrediting Agencies, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Feb. 1,
2018),
https://www2.ed.gov/admins/finaid/accred/
accreditation_pg5.html#NationallyRecognized [https://perma.cc/ZMH7-WK9W].
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of education or training provided by institutions of higher education.”67
To meet this standard, the accrediting agency seeking recognition must
address the quality of the institution or program by setting achievement
standards regarding numerous factors, such as fiscal and administrative
capacity and job placement.68
C. The Predatory Nature of For-Profit Colleges
For-profit colleges have been scrutinized for their predatory
enrollment practices in recent years.69 By continually authorizing
federal student aid, the DOE is funding these practices as well as the
profits they accrue and distribute to their investor-owners.70 The
investor-owners of these colleges are profiting at the expense of the
students.71
In 2015, in response to the Corinthian Colleges closing, the DOE
claimed to recognize the abusive college tactics seen frequently in the
for-profit college sector, and, supposedly, heightened investigations,
improved enforcement, and increased regulations as a result.72 Although
the DOE announced these intentions with regard to the oversight of
predatory conduct, their lack of action says otherwise.73 When
questioned about the disbursement of funds to subpar for-profit colleges,
the DOE indicated that they cannot withhold federal aid from colleges
based only on accusations; however, many of these for-profit colleges
have a proven use of illegal practices and somehow still maintain
eligibility to receive DOE funds.74
One such college is Education Management Corporation (EMC),

67. Id.
68. 34 C.F.R. § 602.16 (2016). These factors also include state licensing examinations,
course completion, curricula, student support services, recruiting and admissions practices,
and student complaints. Id.
69. Patricia Cohen, For-Profit Colleges Accused of Fraud Still Receive U.S. Funds,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/13/business/for-profitcolleges-accused-of-fraud-still-receive-us-funds.html.
70. Id.
71. Richard North Patterson, Too Many For-Profit Colleges Defraud Students and
Taxpayers Alike, BOS. GLOBE (June 5, 2017), http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2017/06/
05/too-many-for-profit-colleges-defraud-students-and-taxpayers-alike/
6jKnrUaLp9Ue1SPcgU4nUL/story.html.
72. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Fact Sheet: Protecting Students from Abusive
Career Colleges (June 8, 2015), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/fact-sheet-protectingstudents-abusive-career-colleges [https://perma.cc/BJL6-E6SB].
73. Cohen, supra note 69.
74. Cohen, supra note 69.
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which operates about 110 for-profit colleges around the United States,
specializing in specific trades, such as cooking and the arts.75 This
institution has been investigated or sued in at least twelve states for its
predatory behavior and allegedly illegal practices.76 In 2014, a class
action lawsuit was also filed for the “deceptive enrollment practices and
manipulated federal student loan and grant programs.”77 Despite these
investigations and lawsuits against EMC, the DOE awarded
approximately $1.25 billion in federal loans to students enrolled in
EMC-operated colleges the following academic year.78
For-profit colleges have mastered the art of “exploiting loopholes,
sidestepping rules or taking advantage of yearslong [sic] appeals
processes” to continue obtaining federal aid from the DOE.79 They are
successful in maintaining financial aid eligibility because they can “pool
graduation, financial, enrollment, staffing[,] and other statistics to mask
weak performers.”80 In 2014, colleges that exceeded the acceptable
standard for the allowed student loan default rate still received about
$116 million in federal aid from the DOE.81 At Everest University, an
operating for-profit college, only twenty-two percent of the students
“paid ‘at least $1 towards the principle balance of their federal [student]
loans within [three] years of leaving school.’”82 This problem has
become so widespread that thirty-seven state Attorney Generals have
teamed up to prosecute for-profit colleges.83 These prosecutors are
investigating 152 colleges that collectively received about $8.1 billion in
federal aid from the DOE in 2015.84
Consider Alta Colleges, which are a group of for-profit colleges
owned by a private equity firm operating in several states.85 According
to the complaint filed by the Illinois Attorney General’s Office, a threeyear degree in law enforcement at Alta Colleges costs approximately

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. C. Tyler Flores, Unprecedented Uncertainty: The Corinthian Colleges Debacle, the
Department of Education’s Response, and the Bankruptcy Practitioner’s Dilemma, 39 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 651, 662 (2016) (quoting College Scorecard, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.).
83. Cohen, supra note 69.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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$75,000.86 However, less than four percent of graduated students are
actually employed in this area.87 Many of the students with a degree
from Alta Colleges are employed in retail, security, or other similar jobs
that typically require only a high school diploma.88 Additionally, many
of these lawsuits have settled, which can be for amounts ranging from
about $1.5 million to $95.5 million.89 Frighteningly, such settlements
are paid with the funds derived from the DOE through the federal
financial aid program because an “overwhelming bulk of revenue” at
for-profit colleges is derived from federal aid.90 Massachusetts Attorney
General Maura Healy stated that these colleges exist solely because of
taxpayers, and the DOE has the authority to “cut off funds” based on the
Attorney General’s findings.91 The idea of taxpayers funding for-profit
predatory practices is continually criticized, but lawmakers and agency
officials have resisted the much-needed change.92
With regard to this predatory conduct, Corinthian Colleges, prior to
their closing, used recruiting tactics that targeted impoverished
prospective students in order to make a profit.93 For example, the
college administration recruited homeless and unemployed students,
promised them strong future careers, and pushed them into thousands of
dollars in student loans they knew the students could not afford.94
Corinthian Colleges explicitly defined their target prospective
students to include those with “low self-esteem,” and who are “isolated”

86. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief at 2, Illinois
v. Alta Colls. Inc., No. 14-cv-03786, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123053 (N.D. Ill. 2014),
http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2014/11/IL-AG-second-amendedcomplaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6MP-WM74].
87. Id.
88. Cohen, supra note 69.
89. Id.; For-Profit College Company to Pay $95.5 Million to Settle Claims of Illegal
Recruiting, Consumer Fraud and Other Violations, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Nov. 16, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/profit-college-company-pay-955-million-settle-claims-illegalrecruiting-consumer-fraud-and [https://perma.cc/L9EX-4Q22].
90. See Cohen, supra note 69.
91. Id.
92. JOHN AUBREY DOUGLASS, CTR. FOR STUDIES IN HIGHER EDUC., MONEY,
POLITICS AND THE RISE OF FOR-PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE US: A STORY OF
SUPPLY, DEMAND AND THE BRAZILIAN EFFECT 8 (2012), https://cshe.berkeley.edu/sites/
default/files/publications/rops.jad.forprofitsus.2.15.2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/XC3S-N9JX].
93. See Annie Waldman, How a For-Profit College Targeted the Homeless and Kids
with Low Self-Esteem, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/howa-for-profit-college-targeted-homeless-and-kids-with-low-self-esteem [https://perma.cc/UT4SM7LR].
94. Id.
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with “few people in their lives that care about them.”95 The colleges
advertised “high demand” programs that were never actually offered at
any of their campuses in order to appear more often on web searches and
attract more prospective students.96 Moreover, Corinthian Colleges
encouraged students to borrow private funds from a financially tied bank
without disclosing this connection.97 These for-profit colleges are
manipulating and taking advantage of students in order to increase
profits.98 Since for-profit colleges are focused on profits and the bottom
line, their business model encourages admission of vulnerable students
who are eligible for the maximum allottment of federal aid.99 This
profit-motivated business model ultimately cultivates these predatory
practices.100
D. Government Reports Indicate the Higher Education System Has
Needed Reform for Years
Government committees, such as the United States Accountability
Office (GAO) and the Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP)
Committee, have been assigned to investigate and propose changes to
the for-profit college concern.101
1. United States Government Accountability Office
The GAO is an agency that works for Congress with the purpose of
“investigat[ing] how the federal government spends taxpayer dollars.”102
The GAO advises Congress and other governmental agencies in order
“to make government more efficient, effective, ethical, equitable[,] and

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See generally Sarah Ann Schade, Reining in the Predatory Nature of For-Profit
Colleges, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 317 (2014) (discussing the business model of for-profit colleges).
99. Id. at 322.
100. See generally id.
101. See GEORGE A. SCOTT, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-600,
PROPRIETARY SCHOOLS: STRONGER DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO
HELP ENSURE ONLY ELIGIBLE STUDENTS RECEIVE FEDERAL STUDENT AID (2009),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09600.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W56M-B6HR];
RICHARD
HILLMAN, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-150, FOR-PROFIT SCHOOLS:
EXPERIENCE OF UNDERCOVER STUDENTS ENROLLED IN ONLINE CLASSES AT SELECTED
COLLEGES (2011), https://www.gao.govassets590586456.pdf [https://perma.cc5DEX-8HHL].
102. About GAO, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., https://www.gao.gov/about/
index.html [https://perma.cc/26QB-5HQT].
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responsive.”103
In August 2009, the GAO recommended stronger oversight of forprofit colleges to ensure that only eligible students receive financial
aid.104 While the government’s policies require certain standards before
a student receives financial aid, the lack of oversight allows colleges,
particularly for-profit colleges, to abuse federal funding. 105 From 2001
to 2009, federal student aid at for-profit colleges increased by 164%.106
Yet, in 2004, the default rate for students attending for-profit colleges
was nearly double the rate of nonprofit and public colleges.107 The
investigation of for-profit colleges found that many were violating rules
for admissions testing to ensure more students were eligible for
enrollment.108 For example, some test administrators provided students
with the answers to the admissions tests, and others changed students’
answers after submission.109
The investigation also discovered that for-profit colleges were
referring students to “diploma mills” in order to meet the high school
diploma requirement before enrolling.110 These diploma mills allowed
students without a high school diploma to pay for an invalid diploma
that required little academic effort “in order to obtain access to federal
student loans.”111 Despite evidence of these practices, the DOE has yet
to “establish[] clearly written policies to help ensure high school diploma
requirements are met” before disbursing federal funds.112
In October of 2011, the GAO conducted an investigation of forprofit colleges by enrolling undercover students in online classes at
different colleges to determine any activity that was not compliant with
federal regulations.113 The GAO initiated the investigation due to
changes in the scale and scope of for-profit colleges—specifically, their
consumption of $32 billion in government grants and loans in the 2009–
10 school year.114 The GAO reported the results of the investigation to

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
SCOTT, supra note 101, at 28–30.
Id. at 28–29.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id.
See HILLMAN, supra note 101.
Id. at 1.
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Congress, and found that among the fifteen for-profit colleges involved
in the report, seven acted in a manner inconsistent with policies or
federal regulations.115 This continued concern about for-profit colleges
with no action by the DOE confirms that students need a legal remedy to
protect against being taken advantage of by private for-profit colleges
with the assistance and financing of the federal government. 116
In 2012, the GAO once again investigated the deceptive practices of
for-profit colleges and found that the abusive admissions-testing
practices continued since the 2009 investigation.117
The 2012
investigation suggested stronger oversight of such practices, but there
continues to be no responsive changes, and the DOE has failed to ensure
compliance with federal regulations.118
2. HELP Committee Report
The HELP Committee proposes legislation related to issues
concerning health, education, labor, and pensions.119 The Senate HELP
Committee Chairman conducted an “oversight investigation focusing
exclusively on the for-profit sector of higher education” between June
2010 and July 2012.120 The findings of the investigation showed that
academic quality at for-profit colleges is significantly less than the
nonprofit and public equivalents due to the business model of for-profit
colleges.121 This disparity is attributed to “[t]he self-reporting and peerreview nature of the accreditation process [that] exposes it to
manipulation by companies that are more concerned with their bottom
line than with academic quality and improvement.”122 This relationship
between for-profit colleges and accreditors, which is designed by the
DOE, adds to the flawed outcomes in the higher education system. 123
The investigation also revealed that for-profit colleges were using

115. Id. at 7.
116. See supra Subpart I.C.
117. U.S. SENATE COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS, FOR PROFIT
HIGHER EDUCATION: THE FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT AND ENSURE
STUDENT SUCCESS 53–54 (July 30, 2012), http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/
for_profit_report/PartI-PartIII-SelectedAppendixes.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2UK7-K3KK]
[hereinafter THE FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD].
118. Id.
119. About, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS,
http://www.help.senate.gov/about [https://perma.cc/KF4K-TN39].
120. THE FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD, supra note 117, at Abstract.
121. Id. at 18.
122. Id. at 8, 123.
123. Id. at 18.
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questionable tactics to evade requirements imposed specifically on them
to address the increasing predatory practices concerns, thereby making
attempts by the DOE to regulate for-profit colleges ineffective.124 There
were three proposed recommendations that came from the investigation:
(1) accuracy in reporting student results to enhance transparency; (2)
more effective oversight of federal financial aid; and (3) “meaningful
protections for students.”125 Interestingly, both ITT Tech and Corinthian
Colleges were examined by the 2010 investigation, but the DOE did not
revoke their financial aid until 2016.126 Despite more than five years of
concern, the DOE did not prepare any remedy or transition for all the
affected students after the colleges were shutdown.127
II.

LACK OF REMEDIES FOR NEGATIVELY IMPACTED STUDENTS

Students wronged by the current financial aid system have few
remedies within the DOE for discharging student loans, and those that
are available are very narrow in scope.128 Students have challenged the
validity of their loans under the DOE loan discharge programs129 and an
implied cause of action,130 but are largely unsuccessful under both
theories.

124. THE FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD, supra note 117, at 8. There are currently two
regulations specifically directed at for-profit colleges: the 90/10 rule and percentage of default
regulations. Id. The 90/10 rule requires that a for-profit college derive a minimum of 10% of
its revenue from funds other than federal student aid, but 90% of its revenue may be from
federal loans and grants. Id. at 8–9. This rule has been scrutinized because Veterans Affairs
benefits can be counted in the 10% of outside funding, so “servicemembers [are seen] as
nothing more than ‘dollar signs in uniform.’” Id. There is also a regulation that revokes
financial aid after a certain percentage of their students are in default. Id. at 9–10.
125. Id. at 10–11.
126. Id. at 20–21; Vasel & Lobosco, supra note 17.
127. See THE FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD, supra note 117, at 168–69; Vasel & Lobosco,
supra note 17.
128. Forgiveness, Cancellation, and Discharge, FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC.,
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation#when
[https://perma.cc/H5K8-V3KW] [hereinafter Forgiveness, Cancellation, and Discharge].
129. See generally id. (discussing the limited means in which a student may discharge a
student loan).
130. See L’ggrke v. Benkula, 966 F.2d 1346, 1348 (10th Cir. 1992); Moy v. Adelphi
Inst., 866 F. Supp. 696, 705 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Williams v. Nat’l Sch. of Health Tech., Inc.,
836 F. Supp. 273, 278–79 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff’d, 37 F.3d 1491 (3d Cir. 1994); Hudson v.
Acad. of Court Reporting, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 718, 719–20 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
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A. Department of Education Programs Designed—but Failing—to
Help Students
There are a variety of loan repayment and discharge programs for
students, but most of these programs do not help the students that need
loan forgiveness the most—those that attended predatory, poor-quality
institutions.131 Absent death or total and permanent disability, there are
only two programs that may apply to students who attended one of the
predatory, for-profit institutions; but these options hardly provide an
adequate financial remedy.132
1. Closed School Discharge
Students may discharge their loans under the Closed School
Discharge Program when their school is shut down because the
government rescinded the school’s financial aid eligibility.133 However,
there are three exceptions to meeting the criteria: (1) the student
withdraws from the institution “more than 120 days before the school
closes”; (2) the student transfers credits to another institution to complete
a comparable degree; or (3) “any other comparable means.”134
Therefore, any student that meets the criteria for one of the three
exceptions will not be eligible for relief from their student loan debt,
even though the DOE revoked financial aid from their institution.135
Additionally, the DOE is responsible for interpreting the criteria, which
is conveniently broad.136
Although this program appears to provide a remedy for students
attending failing for-profit colleges, it still falls short of protecting many

131. The DOE provides loan forgiveness to graduates that are employed as teachers at
low-income elementary or secondary schools and employees in other particular public-service
jobs. Forgiveness, Cancellation, and Discharge, supra note 128. Additionally, there are loan
discharge options for students when loans were incorrectly retained because the college did
not refund per federal regulations or were falsely certified, i.e., identity theft or college
officials improperly disbursing loans. Id. However, these programs fail to specifically assist
the category of vulnerable students discussed in this Note. Id.
132. Douglas-Gabriel, ITT Tech Students, supra note 24.
133. Closed School Discharge, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/
repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/closed-school [https://perma.cc/4XQD-NQHJ].
A
student may be eligible for 100% student loan discharge if the student is enrolled at the
institution at the time of closure, or the school closes within 120 days of the student’s
withdrawal. Id.
134. Id.
135. Closed School Discharge, supra note 133.
136. Id.; see LOAN DISCHARGE APPLICATION: SCHOOL CLOSURE, U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/closed-school-loan-discharge-form.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HE9S-LYXZ].
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similarly situated students.137 For example, a student withdrawing from
the school just one semester before its closing, which is ordinarily more
than 120 days, is excluded from the program based on the 120-day
exception.138
The DOE is fully aware of these deceptive institutions, but takes no
action until years after the recognized concern.139 That same agency
then decides that only those students attending in the last four months
have been negatively impacted enough to allow eligibility for loan
discharge.140 Not only is this an arbitrary line, but the DOE also has the
control and authority to protect students before their situation becomes a
lost cause; however, the DOE has consistently and repeatedly failed to
take preventative action.141
2. Borrower Defense Discharge
Alternatively, students may submit a claim to discharge their student
loans under the DOE’s Borrower Defense Discharge program.142 This
program discharges student loans when a college commits fraud,
misrepresents services, or violates other state laws that relate to the
educational services provided regardless of whether the school is closed
or active.143 When a student submits a claim, the DOE places their loans
into forbearance, so the student is not required to make payments while
the claim is investigated.144 However, interest on those loans will
continue to accrue.145
Although this program seems to provide relief to students negatively
impacted by the current financial aid system, there are still concerns that

137. See Douglas-Gabriel, ITT Tech Students, supra note 24.
138. Id.
139. See supra Subpart I.C.
140. See Closed School Discharge, supra note 133.
141. See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. Department of Education
Announces Final Regulations to Protect Students and Taxpayers from Predatory Institutions
(Oct. 28, 2016), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-announcesfinal-regulations-protect-students-and-taxpayers-predatory-institutions
[https://perma.cc/324D-KVRV] (announcing the need to protect students from predatory
practices in 2016, which is years after the government was made aware of such conduct).
142. See generally Borrower Defense to Repayment, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/borrower-defense
[https://perma.cc/V5WA-SCDH].
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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this solution is not enough.146 For example, the program’s success
“hinges on the discretion of the department,” which continuously
prevents student relief by failing to approve students’ claims for
discharge.147 The DOE is criticized for “view[ing] itself as a debt
collection agency first and a protector of students second.”148 Since the
DOE is concerned with revenue from the interest of the student loans, it
is unlikely that the DOE would have either the incentive or the
determination to internally develop a dependable and effective solution
for the negatively impacted students.149 Additionally, this limited relief
for a fraction of the impacted students could itself be revoked as
presidential administrations change.150
As long as the current financial aid structure remains the same,
students who are negatively impacted by the system need a dependable
resolution with disinterested and neutral decision-makers.151 The DOE
uses the accreditors and the accreditation process as a shield to protect
against liability152—despite awareness of the illegal and deceptive
practices at for-profit colleges—and then provides relief to only a
fraction of the negatively impacted students. The remaining students
that have fallen victim to this predatory conduct need an external,
neutrally, and evenly administered means of establishing and enforcing a
legal claim against the federal government, who repeatedly disburses
funds enabling such conduct.
B. Causes of Action Under the Higher Education Act Similarly Fail
Although there is no explicit cause of action under the Higher

146. See generally Matthew A. McGuire, Subprime Education: For-Profit Colleges
and the Problem with Title IV Federal Student Aid, 62 DUKE L.J. 119, 141 (2012) (discussing
the negative outcomes with regard to for-profit colleges and the inadequacies of the current
governmental financial aid structure).
147. Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Obama Administration Issues Rules to Overhaul
Student Debt Forgiveness, WASH. POST, June 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/grade-point/wp/2016/06/13/obama-administration-issues-rules-to-overhaul-student-debtforgiveness/?utm_term=.cac79941d0f5 [hereinafter Douglas-Gabriel, Obama Administration].
148. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
149. See id.
150. Political administrations on both sides of the aisle—by means of their appointees
to the DOE—use their authority to interpret the broad legislation of Congress to further their
political interests. Jillian Berman, A Glimpse at How Much Power Trump’s Cabinet
Appointees Will Have, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/
a-glimpse-at-how-much-power-trumps-cabinet-appointees-will-have-2016-12-19.
151. See Douglas-Gabriel, Obama Administration, supra note 147.
152. Peter H. Schuck, Tort Liability to Those Injured by Negligent Accreditation
Decisions, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 186 (1994).
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Education Act, students alleging fraud by their institutions rely on a
claim of an implied right of action for the disbursement of loans despite
their institution’s misconduct.153 However, student claims are generally
not successful because courts have declined to consider students the
primary beneficiary of student loans, as required under this cause of
action.154
In Cort v. Ash, the Supreme Court held that an implied right of
action may exist if: (1) the plaintiff belongs to the class that the statute
was intended to benefit; (2) there is an explicit or implicit indication of
legislative intent to provide or deny this remedy; (3) the remedy is
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme; and
(4) the cause of action is not in an area that typically concerns the states,
which would make it inappropriate to infer a cause of action under
federal law.155 It is important to note that under this analysis, the second
and third elements are given more weight to infer an implied cause of
action.156 The Supreme Court later clarifies this standard, holding that
although the factors are relevant, “[t]he central inquiry remains whether
Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private
cause of action.”157
Although the current analysis for an implied cause of action as
applied to the Higher Education Act is inconsistent, most courts
conclude students cannot meet the standard set by Ash.158 Courts have
held that a student seeking an implied cause of action easily satisfies the
first element because students are the intended beneficiaries of the
student loan program as outlined in the Higher Education Act.159 Other
courts find that the government and lending institution—rather than the

153. See Williams v. Nat’l Sch. of Health Tech., Inc., 836 F. Supp. 273, 278 (E.D. Pa.
1993), aff’d, 37 F.3d 1491 (3d Cir. 1994).
154. Hudson v. Acad. of Court Reporting, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 718, 719–20 (S.D. Ohio
1990) (holding that the Higher Education Act was intended to protect against the use of funds
for non-education purposes, so the student is not the intended beneficiary); L’ggrke v.
Benkula, 966 F.2d 1346, 1348 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding no private cause of action under the
Higher Education Act may exist when the statute delegates the authority to the Secretary of
Education); Moy v. Adelphi Inst., Inc., 866 F. Supp. 696, 705 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding there
was no “congressional intent” to create a private cause of action); Williams, 836 F. Supp. at
279 (“[W]here a statute provides an administrative enforcement mechanism, it is presumed
that Congress did not mean to create a private right of action.”).
155. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
156. Hudson, 746 F. Supp. at 719–20.
157. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979).
158. L’ggrke, 966 F.2d at 1348; Moy, 866 F. Supp. at 705; Williams, 836 F. Supp. at
278–79; Hudson, 746 F. Supp. at 719–20.
159. Williams, 836 F. Supp. at 279.
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students—are the intended beneficiaries of the program because the act
prevents the misapplication of federal funds “toward purposes not
intended and unrelated to education.”160
There are also cases that decline to extend students an implied cause
of action because Congress cannot intend a private cause of action where
a remedy already exists under an administrative enforcement
mechanism.161 Since Congress’ intent is to delegate the authority of loan
discharge to the DOE, it has the sole authority to design a remedy if
desired, meaning a remedy cannot also exist as an implied cause of
action.162 The Higher Education Act “expressly provides remedies to
rectify the very issues raised by [students].”163 Therefore, no implied
cause of action exists.164 However, as explained previously, the DOE
refuses to provide an adequate remedy for students because it is profit
motivated and does not want to provide mechanisms for successful
discharge of student loans.165 Therefore, an implied cause of action is
not a successful remedy for impacted students.
There has been one case in which the court found an implied cause
of action under the Higher Education Act.166 In De Jesus Chavez v. LTV
Aerospace Corp., the District Court of Texas allowed an implied cause
of action for a student, recognizing that “[s]tudent borrowers were a
primary concern of the Higher Education Act of 1965,”167 and “[t]he
entire program is based on the needs of . . . student borrower[s] and
exists for [their] benefit.”168 However, other courts have taken issue
with this interpretation, claiming it is “excessively broad.”169
Courts are also hesitant to find an implied cause of action because
“implied right of action cases ‘reflect a concern, grounded in separation
of powers, that Congress rather than the courts controls the availability
of remedies for violations of statutes.’”170 This means that the court

160. Hudson, 746 F. Supp. at 721; see also Phillips v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance
Agency, 497 F. Supp. 712, 723 (W.D. Pa. 1980), rev’d, 657 F.2d 554 (3d Cir. 1981).
161. L’ggrke, 966 F.2d at 1348; Williams, 836 F. Supp. at 279–80.
162. L’ggrke, 966 F.2d at 1348; Williams, 836 F. Supp. at 279–80.
163. Moy, 866 F. Supp. at 705.
164. Id.
165. See Douglas-Gabriel, ITT Tech Students, supra note 24.
166. De Jesus Chavez v. LTV Aerospace Corp., 412 F. Supp. 4, 6–7 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
167. Id. at 6.
168. Id.
169. Moy, 866 F. Supp. at 704; Hudson v. Acad. of Court Reporting, Inc., 746 F. Supp.
718, 720 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
170. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 300 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 n.9 (1990)).
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system does not want to substitute its judgment for Congress to provide
a remedy for a negatively impacted student.171 Therefore, a student
negatively impacted by the structure of the higher education system is
not likely to find a remedy within the court under an implied cause of
action.
III.

FEDERAL ESTOPPEL CLAIM

In general, estoppel is a legal doctrine “invoked to avoid injustice in
particular cases.”172 Estoppel against the government is an area of the
law that lacks guidance for interpretation and analysis.173 The theory of
equitable estoppel against the government has been used to prohibit the
government’s recovery of damages under its own legal theory, and also
to prevent the government from undermining a plaintiff’s cause of
action.174 In a case where a plaintiff brings suit against the government,
estoppel serves “as a shield against a government claim that would have
defeated recovery.”175
It is very difficult to bring an estoppel claim against the
government.176 However, a student buried in debt from institutions with
predatory practices does not have many options under the current
financial aid structure.177 The confusion in estoppel law serves as an
opportunity for a student to find relief because the body of law is in need
of reform and students are still in need of an adequate remedy. 178
A. Estoppel Standard
It is well established that “the Government may not be estopped on
the same terms as any other litigant.”179 However, the Supreme Court
recognizes that there may be occasions where the “public interest in
ensuring that the Government can enforce the law free from estoppel
might be outweighed by the countervailing interest of citizens in some
minimum standard of decency, honor, and reliability in their dealings

171. Id.
172. Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 59 (1984).
173. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 422 (1990).
174. Jablon v. United States, 657 F.2d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 1981).
175. Id. at 1069.
176. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 496 U.S. at 422.
177. See supra Part II.
178. See Andrew P. Kelly, Share the Risk on Student Loans, AEI (Sept. 7, 2016),
https://www.aei.org/publication/share-the-risk-on-student-loans/
[https://perma.cc/G4BJKV58].
179. Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984).
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with their Government.”180
In order to prevail, the party bringing the claim must first satisfy the
traditional elements of estoppel,181 which include (1) “a material
misrepresentation by a party who had reason to know of its falsity”; (2)
reasonable reliance on the misrepresentation; and (3) the party seeking
estoppel is disadvantaged due to that misrepresentation.182 In addition to
these basic elements, government liability also considers “affirmative
misconduct” on the part of the governmental body the claim is being
brought against.183 All governmental agencies may be subject to an
estoppel claim.184 However, the government will not be responsible for
the statements of its agents.185
Despite recognizing that an estoppel claim against the government
may exist under strict circumstances, the Supreme Court has never found
a case that has satisfied the narrow standard of “affirmative
misconduct.”186 However, the Court refused to adopt a bright line rule
of no estoppel against the government, which seemingly encourages
lower courts to allow such claims to be successful in particular
circumstances.187 The government may be estopped when its “wrongful
conduct threatens to work a serious injustice and if the public’s interest
would not be unduly damaged by the imposition of estoppel.”188
However, without proper guidance from the Supreme Court in defining
the “affirmative misconduct” standard, lower courts will continue to be
split on the issue.189

180. Id. at 60–61.
181. Id. at 61.
182. Falcone v. Pierce, 864 F.2d 226, 228 (1st Cir. 1988).
183. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 421 (1990).
184. Tarco, Inc. v. Conifer Metro. Dist., 316 P.3d 82, 90 (Colo. App. 2013) (holding
equitable estoppel may be applied to governmental agencies, as the purpose is to “prevent
manifest injustice.”). However, other jurisdictions have declined to allow an estoppel claim
against a government agency. McBride v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 31 N.Y.S.3d 506, 506
(N.Y. App. Div. 2016).
185. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 496 U.S. at 419–20.
186. Heckler, 467 U.S. at 67.
187. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 496 U.S. at 423.
188. United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 1973); see also
United States v. Boccanfuso, 882 F.2d 666, 680 (2d Cir. 1989); Squillacote v. United States,
747 F.2d 432, 438 (7th Cir. 1984). Although Squillacote was not strictly an estoppel case, the
court held the government could be estopped when it “unconscionably delayed” the discovery
of a jurisdictional defect and used deceptive legal tactics. Id.
189. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 791 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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B. Distinguishing Between Proprietary and Sovereign Activities
A court may also consider the difference between governmental
actions in a proprietary and sovereign capacity.190 The government acts
in a sovereign capacity “by merely performing its ‘governmental’
functions.”191 When the government acts in a proprietary capacity by
“launching a profitmaking enterprise, ‘a State leaves the sphere that is
exclusively its own’” “and enters into activities subject to congressional
regulation, it subjects itself to that regulation as fully as if it were a
private person or corporation.”192 “The touchstone of whether the
government is acting in its proprietary capacity or sovereign capacity is
whether the government is entering into ordinary contractual relations
with its citizens or whether it is seeking to enforce a public right or
interest.”193 Some jurisdictions require that the government act in a
proprietary capacity in order to have a claim of estoppel.194 Other
courts, although reluctant, still recognize liability if the government is
acting in its sovereign capacity.195 In Hicks v. Califano, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that the government was acting in a sovereign
capacity when insuring student loans because the loans are for the public
interest based on the legislative history of the 1965 Higher Education
Act.196 The Rhode Island Supreme Court oppositely held that an
agency’s “essential function was to collect the principal and interest on
outstanding student loans and to maintain records on all transactions,”
which was proprietary in nature.197
Other jurisdictions have noted that interpreting whether the
government is acting in a sovereign or proprietary capacity is
“impossible,” and must be determined by looking at the surrounding
circumstances.198 “The purpose and character of the undertaking, and
the method of its operation determine whether it is public or private.”199

190. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 695 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
191. Id.
192. Id. (quoting Parden v. Terminal Ry. Ala. State Docks Dep’t, 377 U.S. 184, 196
(1964)); Parden v. Terminal Ry. Ala. State Docks Dep’t, 377 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
193. Hicks v. Califano, 450 F. Supp. 278, 283 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (quoting Moody
Nursing Home, Inc. v. Matthews, No. C75-72 (N.D. Ga. 1977), aff’d sub nom. Hicks v.
Harris, 606 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1979).
194. United States v. Vonderau, 837 F.2d 1540, 1541 (11th Cir. 1988).
195. United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 1973).
196. Califano, 450 F. Supp. at 283–84.
197. Rhode Island Student Loan Auth. v. NELS, Inc., 550 A.2d 624, 627 (R.I. 1988).
198. Williams v. Town of Morristown, 222 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949),
decree modified, 222 S.W.2d 615 (Tenn. 1949).
199. Id.

2018]

THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF STUDENT LOANS

145

Alternatively, other courts have found that the sovereign-proprietary
distinction is not helpful in determining whether the government should
be estopped.200 This is because the purpose of estoppel is to prevent
injustice, so a claim should not hinge on the type of activity in which the
government engaged.201 It has also been noted that “the distinction is not
sufficiently calibrated to implement that concern in every situation.”202
However, this distinction between the sovereign and proprietary capacity
suggests a public policy concern of hindering the government with
meritless estoppel claims.203
C. Material Misrepresentation
To bring a successful estoppel claim against the government, the
claimant must prove the traditional elements of estoppel, so there must
first be a material misrepresentation.204 A material misrepresentation
sufficient for an estoppel claim can be established if “the governmental
official or agency made misrepresentations, whether by misleading
statements, conduct, or silence, that induced the party to act.”205
Additionally, misrepresentations may be made to third parties, as defined
under the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
The maker of a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss to another who acts in justifiable reliance upon it if the
misrepresentation, although not made directly to the other, is made to
a third person and the maker intends or has reason to expect that its
terms will be repeated or its substance communicated to the other, and
that it will influence his conduct in the transaction or type of
transaction involved.206

A representation is not limited to words, but also includes acts or
“[c]onduct calculated to convey a misleading impression.”207 This prong
of the test may be satisfied with “a false representation or concealment
of a material fact.”208

200. Mesaba Aviation Div. of Halvorson of Duluth, Inc. v. Itasca Cty., 258 N.W.2d
877, 880 (Minn. 1977).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 61 (1984).
205. State v. Brown, 95 A.3d 82, 87 (Me. 2014).
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 533 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
207. Flagship Resort Dev. Corp. v. Interval Int’l, Inc., 28 So. 3d 915, 923 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2010) (quoting Francoeur v. Pipers, Inc., 560 So. 2d 244, 245 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
208. In re Rowland, 275 B.R. 209, 217 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2002).
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D. Reliance
Next, in order to establish an estoppel claim, the claimant must
prove that there was reasonable reliance on the material
misrepresentation.209 To prove justifiable reliance, courts consider the
totality of the circumstances, looking at the relationship of the parties, as
well as the intelligence, age, and knowledge of the parties.210 In order to
show reliance, “[t]he party asserting estoppel must show that it ‘would
not have so acted but for the conduct or representations of the other party
and that [it] had no knowledge or convenient means of ascertaining the
true facts which would have prompted [it] to react otherwise.’”211 A
party that asserts estoppel can prove reliance on the misrepresentation
based on either their inaction or action.212
E. Adverse Impact
The final traditional element of an estoppel claim requires the
claimant to demonstrate that relying on the misrepresentation caused
them to suffer an adverse impact.213 An adverse impact means the
student was disadvantaged based on the misrepresentation.214 In order to
establish this requirement, the adverse impact must outweigh the
unfairness that would otherwise occur to the party asserting estoppel.215
F.

Affirmative Misconduct

In addition to the three elements of a traditional estoppel claim,
affirmative misconduct is considered in a claim of estoppel against the
government.216 Although there is a lack of guidance from the Supreme
Court regarding estoppel of the government, generally courts have
concluded that this component “requires an affirmative act to
misrepresent or mislead.”217 Therefore, a mere act of negligence is not

209. Heckler, 467 U.S. at 61.
210. Finomore v. Epstein, 481 N.E.2d 1193, 1196 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); Hanson v.
Acceptance Fin. Co., 270 S.W.2d 143, 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954); Thomas v. Am. Workmen,
14 S.E.2d 886, 888 (S.C. 1941).
211. Loyola Univ. v. Humana Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 895, 902 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting De
Graw v. State Sec. Ins. Co., 351 N.E.2d 302, 309 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976)).
212. Pagan v. Integrity Sol. Servs., Inc., 42 F. Supp. 3d 932, 934 (E.D. Wis. 2014).
213. Heckler, 467 U.S. at 61.
214. Falcone v. Pierce, 864 F.2d 226, 228 (1st Cir. 1988).
215. Schafer v. City of Los Angeles, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 655, 658 (Cal. Ct. App 2015).
216. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 421 (1990).
217. LaBonte v. United States, 233 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Gibson v.
West, 201 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir. 2000)).
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enough to prove affirmative misconduct.218 One measure to determine
affirmative misconduct includes “‘ongoing active misrepresentations’ or
a ‘pervasive pattern of false promises’ as opposed to ‘an isolated act of
providing misinformation.’”219 A misstatement alone does not establish
affirmative misconduct by the government;220 courts will look at the
totality of the circumstances to determine a claim of estoppel.221 It is
also more likely to find affirmative misconduct when the
misrepresentations are written rather than oral.222
IV.

NEGATIVELY IMPACTED STUDENTS MANIPULATED BY FORPROFIT COLLEGES SHOULD HAVE A SUCCESSFUL CLAIM OF
ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT

Students should be able to estop the government from collecting
their student loans in situations where they attended a for-profit,
predatory college known to use illegal tactics and the government
continued to authorize the disbursement of its federal funds.223 Estoppel
is the appropriate remedy because there are currently no other viable
protections for these students against this predatory conduct that is
enabled and tolerated by the DOE.224 The federal government will
continue to financially benefit from the interest accrued from the
outstanding debt, and for-profit colleges will remain financially
dependent on the revenue from the DOE through the financial aid
programs, so there is no motivation to change or revise the system from
within.225 Therefore, to create accountability for the financial aid
scheme that cultivates these actions, students should have a claim of
estoppel against the government as a remedy.

218. Id.
219. Purcell v. United States, 1 F.3d 932, 940 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting S & M Inv. Co.
v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 911 F.2d 324, 329 (9th Cir. 1990)).
220. Rider v. United States Postal Serv., 862 F.2d 239, 241–42 (9th Cir. 1988)
221. State v. Brown, 95 A.3d 82, 88 (Me. 2014).
222. See Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 65 (1984)
(“Written advice, like a written judicial opinion, requires its author to reflect about the nature
of the advice that is given to the citizen, and subjects that advice to the possibility of review,
criticism, and reexamination.”).
223. See supra Subpart I.C.
224. See supra Part II.
225. See supra Subpart I.C.
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A. The Modern Day Higher Education Structure is Proprietary—
Rather Than Sovereign—in Nature
Indeed, the government student loan program began as a means to
encourage students to pursue an otherwise nearly impossible opportunity
to attend college, but the current profit model of the system is
proprietary in nature.226 In the 2013 fiscal year, student loans accrued
more profits than all but the two highest earning companies in the
world.227 Despite claiming to have student interests at the core of its
mission, the government refuses to allow students to refinance the
interest rates of loans that are “almost twice the rate of an average 30year mortgage—and, more to the point . . . three times what it costs the
federal government to borrow.”228 This shift in the system from student
interests toward a profit-based model creates a proprietary activity of the
government.229
B. The DOE Materially Misrepresents the Quality of For-Profit
Colleges
In the case of the higher education system, the DOE has
misrepresented institutions’ overall quality by means of misleading
statements, conduct, and silence.230 The DOE states misleading
information by not only providing—but also encouraging—students to
review their published information “when selecting postsecondary
institutions,” in order to protect against enrolling in a “diploma mill.”231
The DOE further publishes a “positive list” of colleges and universities
that the Secretary of Education recognizes as accredited for the benefit

226. Vasel & Lobosco, supra note 17.
227. David Jesse, Government Books $41.3 Billion in Student Loan Profits, USA
TODAY (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/11/25/federalstudent-loan-profit/3696009/ [https://perma.cc/RT7C-G7HM]. This amount is based on the
accounting principles set forth in the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, which some argue
does not appropriately take into account the complex factors of student loans. However, this
was a legitimate method of determining the amount profited by measuring “the cash outflow
as the disbursement of the principal loan amount and the inflowing money as the payments of
interest and principal, minus amounts not paid, plus any fees the government receives from the
borrower.” Id.
228. Dan Kadlec, Why Can’t People with Student Loans Refinance at Better Rates?,
TIME (Feb. 20, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/02/20/why-cant-people-with-studentloans-refinance-at-better-rates/ [https://perma.cc/QV8Q-X4NQ].
229. Vasel & Lobosco, supra note 17.
230. See supra Subpart III.A.
231. Diploma Mills and Accreditation, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/
students/prep/college/diplomamills/index.html [https://perma.cc/7EVX-68MV].
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of prospective students’ decision-making, which endorses and directs
students to the deceptive for-profit colleges.232
In terms of conduct, the DOE sets minimum requirements for
accreditation procedures, which allows for-profit colleges to obtain
accreditation and financial aid eligibility notwithstanding the predatory
conduct.233 The DOE also asserts that accredited institutions “are
reviewed on a routine basis to ensure students receive a quality
education and get what they pay for.”234 According to the DOE,
“[a]ccreditation’s quality assurance function is one of the three main
elements of oversight governing the Higher Education Act’s . . . federal
student aid programs.”235 Despite awareness of particular institutions’
involvement with illegal and deceptive practices, the DOE continues to
allow accreditors to approve of these colleges.236 This in turn causes
students to feel confident in attending these institutions and taking on
massive amounts of student loans237—while unaware of the high risk of
failure.238 Additionally, the DOE also fails to increase eligibility
standards or revoke financial aid for colleges they have investigated and
proven to be below acceptable quality levels.239
Despite its inaction, the DOE has the authority to increase the
standards by which colleges are evaluated through the accreditation
process.240 However, in the rare instance where the DOE takes action
toward subpar colleges by revoking financial aid, there is no transition
process in place to assist the students that were enrolled at the
institutions to gain any benefit from their education.241 Without an
adequate transition in place, a student is left without any remedy after

232. See id.; Office of Postsecondary Education—Information for Students, U.S. DEP’T
EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/students/prep/college/index.html [https://perma.cc/38Q6S6LK].
233. See supra Subpart I.B.
234. Diploma Mills and Accreditation—Accreditation, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
https://www2.ed.gov/students/prep/college/diplomamills/accreditation.html#accredited
[https://perma.cc/R84Q-PBUT].
235. Accreditation, supra note 65.
236. See supra Subpart I.D.
237. FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES: THEIR MARKETS, REGULATIONS,
PERFORMANCE, AND PLACE IN HIGHER EDUCATION 110 (Guilbert C. Hentschke et al. eds.,
2010).
238. See supra Subpart I.D.
239. See supra Subpart I.D.
240. 34 C.F.R. § 602.16 (2010).
241. See Vasel & Lobosco, supra note 17.
OF
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accepting thousands of dollars of debt.242 By not making any changes to
their current system, the DOE is effectively encouraging colleges to
disregard standards and regulations to satisfy pressures from
shareholders to make a profit.243
Lastly, the DOE is silent about these risks, and does not adequately
warn students of the predatory tendencies of for-profit colleges.244 The
government recently attempted to provide students with relevant
information regarding colleges with the “College Scorecard” Program.245
However, critics of this new program find the data too broad to be
meaningful,246 as it fails to provide pertinent information.247 For
example, colleges that have certificate programs and also receive
financial aid are not included in the “College Scorecard” database.248
While it is difficult to prove that the DOE is the body making
material misrepresentations directly to students, persuasive arguments
exist regardless.249 The government delegates college accreditation to
independent agencies, so it is removed from the direct process of
evaluating the colleges.250 However, through the accreditation process,
the DOE allows colleges to represent that they are guaranteed by the
agency.251 Regardless of this separation, the DOE should not be able to
shield itself against liability by using separate accrediting agencies to
approve these colleges—a process over which the DOE has direct
control—and later assert that it cannot be held responsible for negatively

242. Id.
243. See generally Schade, supra note 98.
244. See generally THE FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD, supra note 117.
245. COLLEGE SCORECARD, https://collegescorecard.ed.gov [https://perma.cc/WY4T4NDN]. The College Scorecard Program is intended to “provide[] students and families the
critical information they need to make smart decisions about where to enroll for higher
education.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Education Department Releases College
Scorecard to Help Students Choose Best College for Them (Feb. 13, 2013),
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/education-department-releases-college-scorecardhelp-students-choose-best-college-them [https://perma.cc/BH3Q-9GX4].
246. J. Randall O’Brien, President Obama’s New College Scorecard Receives an ‘F,’
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 15, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/j-randall-obrien/
president-obamas-new-coll_b_8137234.html [https://perma.cc/4WNU-4H44].
247. Tyler Kingkade, The Education Department Isn’t Warning Students About Beauty
Schools, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/collegescorecard-beauty-schools_us_56041272e4b00310edfa3f1c [https://perma.cc/5DH8-2Y6T].
248. Id.
249. See supra Subpart III.C.
250. See supra Subpart I.B.
251. See supra Subpart I.B.
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impacted students.252 This is especially concerning given that these
colleges may advertise their supposed high quality and accreditation by
the DOE throughout their admissions process.253
Students also develop a contractual relationship directly with the
DOE when they agree to federal student loans.254 The DOE alone
provides funding for federal loans to students with the “private sector
now participat[ing] in the [federal loan] program only as ‘servicers’ for
the Department of Education, collecting payments, keeping records[,]
and communicating with borrowers.”255 Since the DOE decided to
control the student loan program—eliminating the participation of third
parties—students enter into a contractual obligation with the government
when borrowing federal student loans.256
Ultimately, DOE’s actions and polices enable subpar colleges to
continue deceptive advertisement due to the lack of consequences.257
This reality creates severe financial situations for students, and the
accumulative effect makes it difficult for the government to provide
financial assistance.258
C. Students Rely on the DOE’s Misrepresentations
Since the DOE has the authority to make representations about the
quality of education at a specific college, and does in fact make such
representations, a student’s reliance is more than reasonable.259 To
attend a college or university and receive financial aid, the only
educational requirement is a high school diploma or General Education
Degree equivalent.260 In some cases, a student is not even required to
have a high school diploma or equivalent in order to attend a higher

252. See Schuck, supra note 152, at 186.
253. Stephen Koff, With Taxpayer Money, For-Profit Colleges Spend Massively on
Marketing; Sherrod Brown Wants to Ban the Practice, CLEVELAND (June 16, 2015),
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2015/06/with_taxpayer_money_forprofit_colleges_spend_massively_on_marketing_sherrod_brown_wants_to_ban_the_practice.
html [https://perma.cc/DZ9X-8LFC].
254. See generally supra Section I.A.4.
255. Dynarski, supra note 60, at 9.
256. Id.
257. Koff, supra note 253.
258. Gillen, supra note 8.
259. Reliance is considered unreasonable if the government actor does not have the
authority to make a representation. Kucera v. Bradbury, 97 P.3d 1191, 1203–04 (Or. 2004).
260. Basic Eligibility Criteria, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/
eligibility/basic-criteria [https://perma.cc/T5YH-M3WL].
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education institution and receive financial aid.261 For-profit institutions
also target students based on “class, race, gender, inequality, insecurity,
and shame.”262 Specifically, reports have indicated that admissions
counselors are trained to target prospective students with low income
and lack of family support.263 The federal government is aware of these
predatory tactics and enables the colleges to continue enrolling students
in this manner by authorizing disbursements of federal funds.264 These
funds are the essential source of revenue for these for-profit colleges and
the only means of affordability for these students to attend the
institution.265
For a claim of estoppel, students must demonstrate that, but for the
government’s representations, the student would not have attended that
particular school.266 The government is guaranteeing a school’s quality
through the accreditation process.267 Once a school becomes accredited,
the enrolled students are eligible to receive federal financial aid funds to
attend that institution.268 In the 2014–15 academic year, eighty-nine
percent of students at four-year, for-profit institutions received some
type of federal financial aid.269 If students did not receive these federal
funds, then many, if not all, of those students would be unable to attend
the institution due to the high cost of tuition.270
Students are likely to rely on the DOE’s expertise, and expect they
only provide financial aid to those colleges that meet acceptable
standards.271 Since the government is essentially investing in the

261. Karen W. Arenson, Can’t Complete High School? Go Right to College, N.Y.
TIMES (May 30, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/30/education/30dropouts.html.
262. Astra Taylor & Hannah Appel, Subprime Students: How For-Profit Universities
Make a Killing by Exploiting College Dreams, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 23, 2014, 10:19 PM),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/09/for-profit-university-subprime-student-poorminority [https://perma.cc/3XKH-Q2FN].
263. See supra Subpart I.C.
264. See supra Subpart I.D.
265. See supra Subpart I.D.
266. See supra Subpart III.D.
267. See supra Subpart I.B.
268. See supra Subpart I.B.
269. Fast Facts, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/
display.asp?id=31 [https://perma.cc/TWY4-SGE5].
270. See id.
271. Cf. Addington v. C.I.R., 205 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that reliance on
advice of a professional with knowledge within the industry is not unreasonable). Although
students are not given a report from the DOE at the time of enrollment in a particular school,
the student loan is an all-or-nothing system. See supra Subpart I.B. A school is either
accredited and has the ability to receive financial aid or they are not and receive no federal
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student’s ability to repay the loan, that student is relying on the notion
that the government is confident that the school will provide for gainful
employment.272
In the case with students and the DOE, the accreditors evaluate
colleges based on the government’s standards and certify the institution
for its quality.273 Once that institution is accredited, it has the ability to
communicate that certification to students and award financial aid.274 In
ITT Tech’s academic catalog published for the 2016–17 school year,275
the financial assistance portion of the catalog indicates that it “is
designated as an eligible institution by the U.S. [DOE] for participation
in . . . federal student financial aid programs.”276 It would be reasonable
for the government to expect that the for-profit institution will represent
their quality based on that accreditation and federal aid eligibility.277
D. Students are Adversely Impacted by the DOE’s Policies and Actions
Assuming students could prove that they justifiably relied on
misrepresentations by the DOE, this reliance adversely impacts students
because they receive a degree leading to underemployment, where
students agree to thousands of dollars in debt that will take a lifetime to
repay.278 Even worse, some students do not have the means to finish
their program in order to earn a degree, and these credits are unlikely to
be transferred to another institution.279 The accreditation of failing
colleges causes students to begin their education at a school where the
financial aid eligibility is ultimately revoked, and they are then left with

funds under Title IV. See supra Subpart I.B. A high-quality institution is not entitled to any
more funds from the government than a school that has poor quality. Carey, supra note 16.
Therefore, by the student receiving federal student loans from the institution, they are
effectively confirming the legitimacy of the enrolled program. Students may assume based on
the DOE’s expertise and knowledge of the industry that it only provides funds to schools
meeting particular standards, so no further report would be necessary.
272. See Michael Stratford, Pointing a Finger at For-Profits, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept.
11, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/09/11/study-finds-profit-collegesdrove-spike-student-loan-defaults [https://perma.cc/3WYU-25L3].
273. See supra Subpart I.B.
274. See supra Subpart I.B.
275. This catalog was published for the academic year in which the institution was shut
down by the government due to illegal practices. Vasel & Lobosco, supra note 17.
276. Norwood, MA: 2016–2017 Catalog, ITT TECH. INST. 50 (2016), http://itttech.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/052.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SS4-CF2D].
277. See supra Subpart I.B.
278. See supra Subpart I.C.
279. Vasel & Lobosco, supra note 17.
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massive debt and no degree.280
E. The DOE’s Actions Amount to Affirmative Misconduct
Concerns about the higher education system have been ongoing for
years.281
In 1987, the Bennett Hypothesis recognized that the
government policies and subsidies enable colleges to raise tuition at a
faster rate than inflation, which ultimately increases a student’s overall
debt.282 In terms of the DOE’s affirmative action, it continues to allow
accreditors to certify institutions that they know are a risk to students and
the economy, and authorize the disbursement of federal funds where the
government later profits.283
It is worth noting that when the two largest for-profit institutions
shut down, there were thousands of students negatively impacted by this
system.284 Additionally, there are many economists and other financial
professionals that have found parallels between the housing market crash
of 2008 and the student loan crisis, but the government continuously
accredits and disburses loans to risky, deceptive colleges, despite
awareness of the concern.285
The government built a market which “is artificially altered to a
level that would never be created by a rational free market system.” 286
The DOE is loaning federal funds to students against their own interests,
in situations in which no reasonable investor would finance.287 If there is
no change in the financial aid system to address these concerns, when
the financial bubble bursts, the negative impact on the economy will far
exceed the housing collapse of 2008.288 At least in the case of the
housing market, the home was an asset which could be sold to recoup
losses and homeowners could declare bankruptcy.289 Students cannot
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sell back their college degrees to offset their debt.290 The government is
aware of these concerns and still decides to allow risky, for-profit
universities to be accredited and federally funded.291
Arguably, the DOE’s inaction to find a solution would not rise to
the level of affirmative misconduct. However, when the government
takes years to act against colleges they know are inadequate and
involved in illegal tactics, it makes an affirmative choice to continue to
federally fund the institutions through financial aid.292 This funding
accounts for an overwhelming majority of for-profit colleges’ revenue,
giving the DOE direct control over the sustainability of these colleges
and their deceptive, predatory, and manipulative practices.293 The DOE
has the knowledge and authority needed to improve the accreditation and
loan disbursement process,294 but have made no effective changes.295
F.

Public Policy Against Estoppel

Although students are mistreated by predatory, for-profit colleges,
and have no other viable remedy for relief, there are public policy
concerns against bringing a successful governmental estoppel claim even
in such an unsettling situation as the student loan crisis.
1.

Separation of Powers

One hesitation to find estoppel against the government is the
separation of powers doctrine. “While the courts have the power to
require the other branches of government to conform to their respective
regulations and statutes, our tripartite system of government does not
provide the judiciary with the power to rewrite those regulations and
statutes.”296 The DOE is granted the authority to monitor and regulate
the higher education system.297 Therefore, courts are inclined to sidestep a student remedy when the DOE forms inadequate policies, as it
feels that it is the role of Congress to change the authority granted upon
the agency.298
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However, despite this concern, the separation of powers doctrine
does not prohibit an estoppel claim against the government, but rather
requires a compelling argument.299 It may be inferred that the
affirmative misconduct consideration for governmental estoppel claims
establishes the courts’ involvement.300 Therefore, since the DOE’s
conduct is so egregious, courts should estop the government despite the
policy concern regarding separation of powers.
2. Protecting the Government
In an attempt to protect the government, courts also require a serious
injustice that will not unduly burden the public.301 In the higher
education crisis, the DOE’s conduct is unconscionable considering the
enormous number of students that are negatively impacted by the
policies.302 Due to the number of those affected, discharging so many
students’ loans could likely harm the public.303 However, many of the
students are already not repaying their loans because their education did
not provide them with gainful employment, so the government loses this
funding anyway.304 There are also governmental resources needed to
collect on defaulted loans.305 The type of remedy provided to a student
also affects the amount of harm imposed on the public. A court could
determine that discharging a loan would be excessive, but forgiving the
interest accrual would allow the student to repay the government without
the government profiting from the deceitful school.306
CONCLUSION
Currently, there is no ideal solution for a student that is buried in
debt by a for-profit institution’s illegal operation, of which the DOE is
fully aware. The DOE’s options for loan discharge are limited and
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discretionary,307 and any implied cause of action under the Higher
Education Act is typically unsuccessful.308 The government’s policies
are encouraging the rapid increase of for-profit colleges that are
accountable to shareholders’ wallets over student academic interests.309
A claim of estoppel against the government provides an appropriate
remedy for these vulnerable students based on the confusion and
inconsistent areas in the law. Furthermore, it leaves open an opportunity
to correct the injustice to the students, who otherwise have no options
but to remain in debt to government.
Courts enabling student claims of estoppel is a crucial spark needed
to ignite change—putting student interests first and profits second—
throughout the higher education program. Certainly, the current
structure of the higher education financial aid system—leaving students
buried in enormous amounts of debt from deceptive colleges—cannot be
what President Lyndon Johnson had in mind when he signed the Higher
Education Act of 1965.
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